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Islamic banking, in recent years, has grown at a rapid pace, quickly 
establishing itself as a significant field within Malaysia’s finance sector. With 2004 
estimates placing total Islamic assets at RM85.2 billion, or 10% of Malaysia’s total 
banking sector, the shape and impact of Islamic Banking and Finance will inevitably 
play a role in the development of the Federation’s economic, political and social 
landscapes. With this in mind, the thesis examines Islamic Banking’s growth in 
Malaysia from a religious, fiscal, and political perspective, seeking both to explain 
the current position of the sector in the Federation as well as its relationship with the 
country’s social discourse. 
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What makes the global economy work? Ask this question to economists, 
government officials and academics, and one is likely to receive a plethora of answers 
in return. However, one common denominator diffused throughout responses would 
be the existence of an integrated, global financial network able to handle large 
volumes of capital and financial products. The bedrock of this financial network is the 
institution of a bank, one whose existence precedes the current period of 
globalisation, but whose functions form the basis for many varieties of financial 
services today.  
The incentive for these banks to operate and hence provide financial services 
largely lies within the institution of interest. The ability of a financial institution to 
charge interest on various forms of credit can be seen as one of the main sources of its 
income. However, interest has traditionally been shunned by the three main 
monotheistic religions: Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. While the latter two have 
effectively accepted interest as part and parcel of a secular business environment, 
Muslims have retained significant conflicts between integration into the modern 
economy and adherence to Islamic virtue.  
More than just theology-driven finance 
 
Islamic Banking, although rooted in principles of virtue and morality, is more 
opaque in its origins, current development and future than meets the eye. While 
seeking to remedy the conflicts stated above found in the minds of many adherents to 
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the Muslim faith, Islamic Banking in its present form is, in fact, an amalgamation of 
motivations. Piety is but a single aspect of this, with political motivations as well as 
primordial notions of profit playing a key role in its shape and scope. The merger of 
these incentives leads to a discourse which, in its diversity, can shed light onto the 
political and social processes of a state which promotes Islamic Banking as a source 
of new prosperity and social order. 
Beginning in the 1960s, predominately Muslim countries began 
experimenting with interest-free financial practices under the banner of Islamic 
Banking. While initial attempts were largely unsuccessful, the road was paved for the 
creation of Islamic Banking institutions and products in the future.  
Increasing Relevance 
 
The aforementioned conflict came to a head particularly following the 1979 
Islamic Revolution in Iran. The revolution, while affecting political change in Iran, 
also had a result of creating a resurgence of Islamic identity and values among many 
Muslim societies, both in the Middle East as well as North Africa and Southeast Asia. 
This pressure to get “back to basics” regarding Islamic values and ideals permeated 
various aspects of society. Reflective of this trend was a desire of many to conduct 
business and trade according to the principles set down in the Qur’an and Sunnah, 
which abhorred the notion of interest and unfair dealings concerning trade. As one of 
the most important concepts in Islam is equity, the idea of dishonest exploitative trade 
and business relationships stood in contrast to what many saw as a religious ideal.1 
                                                 
1 Angelo Venardos, Islamic Banking & Finance in Southeast Asia (Singapore: World  
Scientific, 2005), 3. 
3 
One key aspect of the social upheaval that coincided with Iran’s revolution 
was the mandatory conversion of the Iranian banking system to a purely Islamic one. 
Just prior to the events in Iran, Pakistan had taken up similar measures, beginning in 
1978.2 However, in both instances Islamic Banking remained largely localised, and 
was not generally commercialised beyond the national level.  
This phase of Islamic Banking differs from more recent developments due to 
an overriding ideological motivation in setting up such a system. At the time, Islamic 
Banking was more of a political notion than a practical, economic one. A similar 
argument may be placed upon the early stages of Islamic Banking in Malaysia, 
which, although initiated in 1982, remained largely limited to one institution, Bank 
Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB), until the late 1990s.3 
Not just about religion 
 
The relevance of state-led imposition of Islamic Finance in Iran and Pakistan 
to understanding Islamic Banking’s place in social discourse is that it adds 
perspective to a fundamental shift in motivations from just being driven by religious 
dogma to a more multi-faceted approach. This new approach must also be 
contextualised in the rapid expansion of economic power and capital acquisition 
characteristic of the Middle East following the 1970s Oil Crisis. Many states in the 
Persian Gulf suddenly found themselves awash with petrodollars, and hence needed a 
viable means of investment and safe-keeping of newly-available funds.4  Given the 
resurgence of Islamic identity following 1979, the creation of a new Islamic order 
                                                 
2 State Bank of Pakistan, “Islamic Banking FAQs,” [online] 2004; available at 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/ibd/faqs.asp. 
3 Angelo Venardos, op. cit,. 146. 
4 Ibid., 20. 
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seemed viable as a bumper crop of new capital was available. Islamic Banking, it 
seemed, could provide a viable answer to the conundrum of Muslims immersed in 
new wealth.  
One manifestation of this new desire to create an Islamic economic order was 
the creation of the Islamic Development Bank in 1974. The main task of the IDB, 
according to Mannan, is to encourage the implementation of an Islamic economic 
system in member countries. This coincided with a “declaration of intent” to create a 
society in which all Muslims might conduct their lives according to the principles of 
Shari’ah law.5  
Nonetheless, cynicism has plagued Islamic Banking virtually from the start, 
with many accusing it of merely providing conventional financial services with 
interest given another name. It can also be argued that Islamic Banking has merely 
been used as a tool for politicians to effectively neuter Islamist opposition within their 
own countries, by simultaneously increasing government largesse while being able to 
appear to the public as pious Muslims. Adding to this is the perception that Islamic 
Banking has been largely designed for the rich and corporations, and, in practical 
terms, does little to provide opportunities for the poor and marginalised.6 
The haziness of reality 
 
The truth about Islamic Banking, as in many cases, most likely lies 
somewhere in the middle. In Malaysia’s case, it is true that much of the growth in 
Islamic Banking has been found in the issuance of Islamic Bonds, all of which applies 
                                                 
5 M.A. Mannan, “The Islamic Development Bank and Economic Development of Southeast Asia,” in 
Islamic Banking in Southeast Asia, ed. Mohamed Ariff (Singapore: ISEAS, 1988); 173. 
6 Knowledge@Wharton, “Islamic Banking Comes of Age – But What’s Next?” [online] 10 March 
2004; available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=944. 
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to the corporate level. At the same time, the emergence of Islamic Bond as a 
successful and rapidly expanding part of the Malaysian economy does enhance the 
legitimacy of the Malaysian government, which does link its long-standing tenure in 
office to its economic results. This emergence is also politically beneficial in 
silencing some of the criticisms originating from the Federation’s Islamist opposition, 
as the government presents itself as being devoted to the pursuit of Muslim virtue and 
an Islamic economic order.7 However, Islamic Banking’s emergence is far more 
complicated than such generalisations imply.  
It is, in fact, the argument of this thesis that Islamic Banking has created a 
new social discourse which merges religion, politics, and money into a new 
environment of social tension and discourse. The story of Islamic Banking in 
Malaysia is one of piety, profit, and politics, all of which create a new window on the 
machinations of a society negotiating its identity while carving a niche in an 
increasingly globalised world.  
                                                 
7Meredith L. Weiss, “The 1999 Malaysian General Elections: Issues, Insults, and Irregularities,” Asian 
Survey 40, no. 3 (2000): 413.  
6 
CHAPTER II: 
A FRAMEWORK OF CHANGE 
 
Societal Change, Banking and Power 
 
In the historical discourse of societal change, an area commonly overlooked is 
the nature of institutions of power and their place in social hierarchies. As Barrington 
Moore notes in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, modern Asian 
political hierarchies can largely be situated in the context of the transformation from 
societies with landed aristocracies to, in many cases, oligarchies dominated by 
commercial elite.8 In the Asian context in particular, the transition of power from an 
agrarian to a commercial class may be best exemplified in the experience of Japan 
following the Meiji Restoration, in which the Tokugawa Shogunate was effectively 
overthrown in favour of the Emperor. In the Japanese example, the pre-existing elite 
class, mainly consisting of Samurai, was largely marginalized by society through a 
series of reforms aimed at removing the special privileges of the warrior class, 
including, most notably, their stipend of rice which could be used to generate wealth 
through resale.9 Through these reforms, the institutions of power began to shift, 
creating a modern political elite with power derived from commercial prowess 
instead of more traditional power paradigms.   
 The question of prevailing hierarchy in Japan, and the rivalry between the 
Shoguns and the capitalist-industrialist supporters of the Meiji emperor, their 
successors at the commanding heights of national power, was largely settled in the 
                                                 




Satsuma Rebellion.10 Interestingly, similar power paradigms existed in Southeast 
Asia; more specifically, in terms of the role of Sultans in pre-colonial and colonial 
Malaysia. 
In terms of state formation and sources of power, Japan and Malaysia offer 
many similarities in terms of overall structure. In particular, pre-restoration in Japan 
and pre-colonial Malaysia offer similarities in the ability of ruling political elites to 
exercise sovereignty. In both cases, such sovereignty was reinforced through both 
entitlement and tribute, aspects of traditional protocol which would eventually be 
circumvented and dismantled by societal changes.  
Power through tribute 
 
Both the Japanese Samurai and the Malay Bangsawan were largely able to 
solidify their prosperity and elite status through tribute. In the case of the Samurai in 
pre-Meiji Japan, this was accomplished through their entitlement to an allowance of 
rice; in the case of the Bangsawan, the retention of status was accomplished through 
similar tributes executed through the state apparatus.  The Malay state structure that 
allowed this was heavily influenced by Hindu political thought, particularly from 
Kautilya,11 and promoted a relatively stringent social hierarchy. Many aspects of 
Hindu statecraft continued to be influential following the introduction of Islam into 
the Malay states, which began in the 13th Century. 
In this Hindu-Islamic model, the Sultans, in a pattern similar to modes of 
governance in other Southeast Asian states, notably the Javanese kingdoms and Siam, 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 249. 
11 D. McKenzie Brown, “The Premises of Indian Political Thought,” The Western Political Quarterly 
6, no. 2 (1953): 244. 
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stood at the apex of a relatively stringent social pyramid. The legitimacy of this 
system was linked to a mandate to administer the state with some level of divine 
right, a concept which was also transferred through the model of the classical Islamic 
state, which warranted a supreme leader consulted by a Shura, or advisory council.12 
In pre-Islamic times, the Sultans were revered as the earthly incarnation of a Hindu 
deity; following Islam, this status changed to become the “Vice-regent of Allah on 
Earth.”13 While the title was different, the level of deference to the monarchs 
remained largely the same. 
Japan can be seen to mirror this phenomenon, with the Emperor retaining 
divinity and a position of reverence.14 This position of moral authority, at least in 
theory, survived throughout the time of the Tokugawa Shogunate, and was preserved 
following the Meiji Restoration in the 19th Century, when power was transferred to 
capitalist classes.  
The beginnings of change 
 
In Malaysia, unlike Japan, however, the first major transition of state 
legitimacy and the power of traditional feudal leadership came much earlier. The 
catalyst of this change was the introduction of western colonialism, officially 
beginning in 1511 with the Portuguese conquest of Malacca. More importantly, 
though, changes to the Sultans’ authority came with the introduction of resident 
advisors by the British in Malaysia, beginning in the latter half of the 19th Century.   
                                                 
12 Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (New 
York: Routledge, 2001), 40. 
13 Hari Singh, “UMNO Leaders and Malay Rulers: The Erosion of a Special Relationship,” Pacific 
Affairs 68, no. 2 (1995): 188. 
14 Takashi Inoguchi, Japanese Politics: An Introduction (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2005), 56. 
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Commencing with the signing of the Pangkor Treaty of 1874, British residents 
began to take the reins of significant portions of power in the Malay states, most 
notably, as the treaty explicitly states, by overseeing all taxation and collection of 
revenues within the state apparatus.15 These actions followed a similar pattern of 
colonialism found throughout Asia at the time, but which are particularly significant 
in this research as the societal transformations that colonialism brought to Malaysia 
were the first minute steps towards social change.  
As Frantz Fanon notes in his 1959 address to the Congress of Black African 
Writers, a key component of the colonial experience was the stagnation of local 
culture through the essentialising of pre-existing social institutions, including 
leadership.16 With the conclusion of the Pangkor Treaty, this aspect became reality, as 
the role of the Sultans became relegated to matters of culture and religion amongst the 
Malay population, transferring their administrative and political powers to the British 
resident advisors.17 Concurrently, the economic nature of colonialism, largely driven 
by the expropriation of raw materials from colonized regions for export to the home 
country or other markets, a new class of merchants who proved increasingly detached 
from traditional political elites began to develop in many colonial areas. 
During the pre-colonial period in Malaya, especially in the Malacca Sultanate, 
the merchant class, while strong and significant, still occupied a position of 
subservience to the Sultans, who would demand tribute at will.  In this sense, the 
Sultans could be seen to practice an early form of banking, in allowing for stores of 
wealth and goods to be kept at his leisure, provided he was afforded an appropriate 
                                                 
15 Pangkor Agreement [online] 1874; available at http://www.perak.gov.my/english/history/treaty.html 
16 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 236. 
17 Pangkor Agreement, Op. Cit. 
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tribute or port fee.18  In contrast, with the emergence of colonial rule, the Europeans 
addressed private property rights and protection, with control over land being 
increasingly possible without the influence of the Sultans. Moreover, the Sultans’ 
prior position of lordship over property was largely transferred to the colonial 
authorities.  
Nonetheless, in light of the development of private property, a merchant class 
was allowed to develop whose status in society was largely determined by its fiscal 
prowess, as opposed to the previous social paradigm in which social status and power 
was determined by one’s position in a pre-determined hierarchy centring on the 
Sultans.   
As colonial rule became increasingly solidified in Malaysia, and power 
increasingly shifted to colonial administrators, the status and prestige of the merchant 
class was steadily increased. Coinciding with the increased importance of merchants 
was the introduction of modern banks. These institutions were largely focused upon 
facilitating the finance of new enterprises, as well as procurement of land and other 
resources for industry and agriculture. Among the major industries that required such 
procurements were tin mining as well as rubber and palm plantations.19  Banking, in 
supporting such ventures, began taking an ever increasing level of importance in the 
commercial realm. 
                                                 
18 Carolina Lopez C., “The British Presence in the Malay World: A Meeting of 
Civilizational Traditions,” Sari 19, no. 1 (2001): 19. 
19 Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994): 142-172.  
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The struggle to form the modern elite 
 
The emergence of commercial power over the traditional elite continued 
largely unabated until the Japanese occupation of Malaya and the subsequent 
emergence of Malay nationalism in opposition to the British-created Malayan Union 
in 1946.20 Major aspects of the Union plan were the provision of equal citizenship to 
all ethnic groups and the transition of the position of Sultans into state presidents. In 
many ways, the Union was indicative of the emergence of a commercial class 
replacing the traditional social hierarchy. This was due to the fact that the key issues 
of the Union, being citizenship and the status of the Sultans, served as catalysts for a 
Malay nationalist reaction. This reaction was largely driven by the fact that many in 
Malay society felt that the Union’s granting of citizenship and the dissolution of the 
Sultans’ offices signalled a marginalisation of the entire ethnic group21. At the same 
time, the Union reflected an institutionalization of the changes that had chastened 
Malaysian society since the emergence of British colonial influence. 
It is not surprising, then, that the main opposition to the Union, the United 
Malays National Organisation, or UMNO, was heavily supported by the traditional 
elites.22 However, with UMNO gaining political power in 1955, tensions between 
segments of UMNO and the Malay traditional ruling classes began to emerge. While 
many of UMNO’s leaders were themselves aristocrats, such as Malaysia’s first Prime 
Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman,  a large and, over time, increasingly significant 
faction of the party was dominated by Malay nationalists who wished to create a 
                                                 
20 Hari Singh, op. cit., 189. 
21 Max Seitelman, “Political Thought in Malaya,” Far Eastern Survey 16, no. 11 (1947): 129. 
22 Ibid., 190. 
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Malay capitalist class. Two of the most important leaders of this faction were 
Mahathir bin Mohamad and Tun Abdul Razak, respectively.  
Tensions continued until 1969, when race riots broke out in several Malaysian 
cities. Following this event, the UMNO faction led by Tun Abdul Razak gained 
control of the Malaysian Government.23 This faction introduced economic initiatives 
such as the New Economic Policy, ostensibly to improve the social disparity between 
the various major ethnic groups in the Federation. One of the key aims of these 
initiatives was the creation of a Malay middle class, which would rival the already 
existing Chinese bourgeoisie that was largely found in cities and small towns.24  
Furthermore, as part of the New Economic Policy, the banking sector was 
influenced by the creation of institutions focused on providing financial services and 
incentives to Bumiputera, the classification given to Malays and others deemed to be 
indigenous to the country. Banks such as Bumiputera Commerce bank emerged from 
this policy initiative, and began offering services rivalling traditional, Chinese-
operated banking interests such as Public Bank, Hong Leong Bank and RHB. 
In this new, politically altered environment, the nature of the social elite of 
Malaysia began to take on a unique shape. While in many countries, such as Japan, 
power had effectively been transferred to commercial elites, whose status in society 
was purely based upon their wealth, Malaysian society increasingly consisted of elites 
whose wealth and power, and hence social status, was linked to the policies of the 
                                                 
23 Kua Kia Soong, May 13: Declassified Documents on the Malaysia Riots of 1969, (Petaling Jaya: 
Suaram Komunikasi, 2007): 21. 
24 Peter Searle, The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999): 
42. 
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ruling UMNO-led government coalition.25 This was also true in terms of banking; 
with the arrival of NEP-oriented banks, as well as preferences in credit and other 
financial services to Bumiputeras, banks became an increasingly relevant conduit of 
government influence.26  
An increased pace of change 
 
Corresponding with the premiership of Mahathir bin Mohamad (1981-2004), 
Malaysia’s development increased dramatically. A highlight of the changes that took 
place under the Mahathir administration was major investment in infrastructure and 
so-called “mega projects,” involving large sums of capital and a myriad of 
businesses.27 In this context, banks became an increasingly relevant source of power, 
as their access to capital was a major resource in financing the government’s 
development schemes. Conversely, the government was able to solidify its linkage to 
the prosperity of the growing Malay capitalist class, by awarding contracts for 
projects to either Bumiputera headed businesses or government-linked entities.  
Furthermore, with the government’s emphasis on development, political 
legitimacy took a further shift; instead of political legitimacy being based on the 
mandate of the Sultans, which was driven by Hindu and Islamic statecraft, political 
legitimacy became linked with the ability of the government to provide for economic 
growth and prosperity.28  This mandate, as it could only be achieved with a reliable 
source of capital, increased banks’ power, and made them, in a sense, the 
                                                 
25 Hari Singh, op. cit., 194. 
26 Peter Searle, op. cit., 216. 
27 Assif Shameen, “Edifice Complex: Worries over the mega-projects,” AsiaWeek [online] 9 May 
1997; available at http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/97/0905/biz2.html 
28 William Case, ”Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change,” 
Pacific Affairs 66, no. 2 (1993): 198. 
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“middlemen,” providing resources and legitimacy both to the government and to 
those to whom Kuala Lumpur played benefactor. As banks themselves became a key 
political institution, their nature would prove central to the ongoing negotiation 
between traditional and merchant elites in the balance of power in contemporary 
Malaysian society.   
Perceptions and Roles of Banks in the Social Discourse 
 
From a societal perspective, the position of the bank is addressed within the 
framework of a localised version of World Systems theory. Malaysia, in many ways, 
can be seen to mirror core-periphery relationships, with Kuala Lumpur serving as the 
economic and political centre of power, and hence the core. Semi-peripheral regions 
of the country generally correspond to the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, and are 
noted with a generally higher level of development and industrialisation when 
contrasted with agrarian regions. The peripheral regions, which consist of the east 
coast of the Malay Peninsula, Sarawak, and Sabah, remain largely agricultural and 
dominated by raw material acquisition and export.29  
For the purposes of this thesis, the relationship of banks to society will be 
limited to core and periphery, as the semi-peripheral regions’ relationship to the 
central government is largely parallel to that of the periphery, albeit arguably in a 
more privileged position.30 The understanding of this dynamic is particularly 
important, as to how the nature of relationships between banks and clients can be, to 
some degree, influenced by geographies of scale and dependence. 
                                                 
29 Michael Johnstone, “Urban Squatting and Migration in Peninsular Malaysia,” International 
Migration Review 17, no. 2 (1983): 293. 
30 Ibid., 303. 
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Banking in the Periphery 
 
Banking in the periphery of a national economy is generally perceived in the 
classic, retail sense, either as a source of financing for ventures, personal or 
commercial, as well as a source of security for the accumulation of wealth. This is 
due to the fact that the periphery is, in a localised version of world systems, in a 
dependent/servile relationship to the core.31 Banking is a source of power in the 
periphery in as much as the bank exercises power over its creditors, being the 
principal access point for capital.  In the periphery’s case this is particularly 
important, as much of the ventures taking place are related to the procurement and 
distribution of raw materials, ventures which are heavily driven by credit. This power 
is exercised in varying degrees of efficacy across all facets of society, as the bank 
generally offers both personal and commercial financing for a variety of ventures.  
In this way, the bank can be seen both as a key power broker and community 
institution when relating to peripheral groups. This can go further, when the bank is 
responsible for major projects within the town dealing with construction or 
infrastructure, as the bank can become a key community player in providing for 
expansion and development. Banks can provide, in a sense, a modified form of social 
services, allowing for customers to expand and grow with their aspirations. 
Therewith, the bank takes on a more socially integrated role in these areas. 
                                                 
31 Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research 8, No. 2 (1971): 
100. 
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Perceptions from the Core/Corporate Realm 
 
 In the core, which, in this example is the financial centre, which is usually a 
large city where the bank is headquartered. In the core, as opposed to the periphery, 
banking is largely driven by profit. The goal of the bank is to provide value to its 
shareholders and, to that end, to maintain competitiveness in the array and quality of 
products that the bank offers. While the bank, on the local level, may take a personal 
approach, and may indirectly play a role in small-scale projects (i.e. typical retail 
banking services), the role of the core is to facilitate large-scale goals being met. 
While local level concerns are of some importance, much of the bank’s interest is 
focused towards large-scale financial transactions, such as corporate finance (i.e. 
bonds) and major projects which yield substantial profits for the bank when managed 
successfully.32  As an added concern, the core is more directly responsible for 
managing relationships with key political actors, as much scrutiny placed on a bank, 
vis-à-vis corporate governance and auditing is centred upon the corporate 
headquarters. Thus, the motivations of the core are far different from those of the 
periphery groups.   
Banking and the Individual 
 
The motivation of an individual to use a particular bank’s line of products can 
be as varied as its clientele. Often time, the key motivation in terms of selecting a 
bank is the value of the product in terms of favourable rates of repayment or return. In 
this sense, in a traditional banking system, individuals are simply motivated by the 
interest rates in question as to which bank they will utilise to provide for their fiscal 
                                                 
32Peter Searle, op. cit., 220. 
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needs. However, when there is some level of parity between banks in this area, other 
factors may come into play. Among those may be additional value-added services, 
such as easier access to funds, which may make a difference. However, increasingly 
important is the ability of a bank to offer financial products which appeal to a client’s 
particular inclinations in terms of the overall type of product they wish to use.  
A contemporary, secular example of this phenomenon is the emergence of 
such terms as “green” and “ethical” investments, which convey to their users the idea 
that their investments will be limited to areas which conform to their values or beliefs 
(i.e. green investments will not include companies seen to cause ecological damage in 
their operations).33 These instruments have become highly visible, yet it is 
questionable how many clients would continue embrace such opportunities if their 
rate of return was not commensurate with that of more conventional strategies. 
Therewith, whether or not the “green” or “ethical” components of these investments 
represent the critical factor to their success remains to be seen, and may be largely a 
question of personal motivation.  
Ramifications of Motivations  
 
In marketing financial products to potential clients, financial institutions often 
seek to appeal to potential clients not only from a profit motive (i.e. utilisation of 
Bank A’s services will result in a higher rate of return on deposits) but also from a 
broader perspective (Bank A will help one achieve one’s aspirations, is rooted in 
one’s community, etc.).  Islamic Banking, in this sense, is no different. Banks can 
market to potential clients both based on favourable returns and the idea that funds 
                                                 
33 Angelo Venardos, op. cit., 67. 
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will be managed and invested in a religiously-appropriate way, avoiding potential 
pitfalls which may arise from working with traditional retail financial products.34 
On a larger scale, the same may be true of a corporation, but for even more 
sophisticated reasons. While a corporation will desire to utilise various products for 
capital acquisition and fund management, utilising Islamic Banking adds greater 
benefits on several levels. Firstly, in terms of potential public relations, the use of 
Islamic services (such as issuing Islamic sukuk bonds on the Kuala Lumpur 
exchange) can help a corporation appeal to expanding markets in the Islamic world 
by showing cultural sensitivity and a dedication to upholding Muslim virtue.  
Secondly, the nature of Islamic financial products, in which variable interest 
does not exist, can also underwrite a corporation’s bottom line by ensuring a more 
defined amount of capital which must be repaid.  While a company might, in a 
traditional model, need to modify its budgeting to accommodate fluctuations in 
interest from debts incurred, the use of Islamic bonds significantly diminishes 
uncertainties regarding debt accrual, at least marginally putting a corporation in a 
more secure debt framework.35 
With the combination of these ramifications, it is clear to be seen how Islamic 
Banking can be viewed as attractive to both retail and corporate clients. How this 
attractiveness equates to the growth of the industry, as well as the socio-political 
consequences wrought by these developments will receive attention in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER III.  
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC BANKING 
 
 
Islamic Banking, as a concept, is both contemporary and traditional in its 
ideological base and scope. Islamic Banks and financial institutions link the products 
and services they provide directly to principles of fiscal piety propagated by the 
Qur’an and Sunnah, Islam’s two guiding holy texts. Many of the services provided 
are largely reflective of similar conventional mechanisms which are the mainstay of 
banks and financial institutions within the contemporary global, interest-based 
banking system.  Nonetheless, there are a few concepts which roughly form the basis 
of the Islamic financial system, all of which are critical to understand when 
approaching the topic of Islamic Banking, in this case specifically within the 
Malaysian context.   
The idea of riba 
 
First and foremost, the idea of interest is specifically spurned by the Prophet 
Mohammed. While some Islamic scholars have said that prohibition of riba, which 
literally means excess,36 would only apply to excessive interest, most conventional 
Islamic scholarship points to the consensus view that riba is inclusive of any form of 
interest in any financial transaction.37 Hence, the idea of banking being performed in 
an Islamic setting is met with a paradox, as interest generally serves as the backbone 
of commercial viability for any banking institution.   
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Key financial principles 
 
Islamic institutions negotiate this idea largely through the idea of transactions 
which are based upon profit and loss sharing. The foundation of profit and loss 
sharing in Islamic Banking may be narrowed to a few types of transactions: trustee 
finance (mudaraba), equity participation (musharaka), and transactions in which a 
product or service is marked up and resold to the potential client, referred to as 
murabaha. The first of these, mudaraba is an arrangement in which money is 
provided by an investor to a client in exchange for a pre-determined percentage of the 
gains or losses resulting from the venture.38  The capitalist provides most if not all of 
the funds required, while the client ostensibly provides labour.39 A transaction such as 
this is commonly used to facilitate commercial loans handled by banks.  
In situations in which a consortium of partners may be involved in the project 
receiving financing, muskaraka may be used. During this transaction, the investors in 
an enterprise pool their resources, and the degree to which they share in the profit or 
loss is determined by the amount of their initial investment, a determination which 
usually takes the form of a previously agreed upon ratio. The last of the main Islamic 
Banking concepts is murabaha, which is perhaps the most difficult to specify. This 
transaction generally consists of arrangements in which items are acquired by the 
Islamic financial institution, and then resold or leased to clients for a higher price than 
was at its initial acquisition.40 
However, because of a variety of factors, ranging from the legal environments 
of countries in which Islamic Banking has established a significant footing, to just 
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human nature itself, the use of certain principles, most notably Profit and Loss 
Sharing (PLS) as a financial mechanism is rare. More likely than not, profit sharing 
may take place in short term financing as well as loans given to international 
institutions or a government instead of individual clients.41 More likely, equity-driven 
financing as well as mark-up schemes represent the preferable means of providing 
Islamic services. Oftentimes, one might get the impression that the use of such 
schemes, particularly deferred payment sales which would result in repayment of a 
higher price than retail value, essentially mirror the same arrangements as an interest-
driven transaction.42 
What is truly Islamic Finance? 
 
Furthermore, with the increasing breadth of financial products offered by 
Islamic financial institutions, the definition of what exactly constitutes an Islamic 
Banking apparatus has faced increasing scrutiny, as many products deemed ‘Islamic’ 
do, in many cases resemble interest-driven banking services in everything but name.  
Aside from traditional finance services, the breadth and width of products 
which Islamic financial institutions offer has been enhanced dramatically, with a 
variety of products, ranging from home and auto loans to even ‘Islamic Credit Cards’ 
being available to consumers. However, the largest players in Islamic Banking 
continue to be on the corporate rather than the retail end, with Sukuk Islamic bonds 
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being among the most prominent of Islamic securities being traded in Malaysia 
today.43 
However, with the rise of the Islamic financial market, criticisms have and 
continue to arise as to the legitimacy of branding many financial transactions 
‘Islamic’, whether that is due to dubious compliance with Islamic principles or 
similarities to many interest-bearing banking practices.  Further discussion on this 
aspect of the Islamic Banking sector will elucidate this point, which is discussed in-
depth in chapter 5.  
History of Islamic Banking 
 
According to Samer Soliman, many believe that the first commercial Islamic 
bank in the contemporary sense was the Mit Ghamr bank, inaugurated in 1963 in the 
Nile Delta of Egypt.44 As the institution was established during the tenure of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, it was a state-linked entity, and hence had direct accountability to the 
Cairo government. The bank initially prospered, venturing into direct investment with 
title deeds to enterprises and sharing in profits and losses in proportion to the amount 
of capital invested. However, due to its government linkages, and changes in Egypt’s 
political climate, the Mit Ghamr Bank lost its operational autonomy, and hence was 
assimilated into conventional, interest-driven financial institutions.  However, the Mit 
Ghamr Bank possesses relevance as an initial example of Islamic Finance, and one 
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which laid the foundation for further development of the Islamic Banking sector.45 
Mit Ghamr established such a foundation mostly by giving future Islamic Banks and 
other financial institutions a good starting point from which to assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of administering a firm using Islamic principles. 
The Malaysian experience 
 
Islamic Banking in Malaysia had similar roots to the Egyptian beginnings of 
the sector, being created through the promulgation of the Islamic Banking Act. The 
Act, which was officially brought into force in 1983 allowed Malaysia to begin 
development of a dual banking system, one which spans both traditional interest-
driven and Islamic financial services.46 Soon after, Malaysia’s first Islamic bank, 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) was founded, and served as the nation’s sole 
exclusively Islamic financial institution until 1999. That year saw a second player, 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad, entering the Islamic marketplace.47  
Both these institutions and all further Islamic financial ventures were and still 
are governed by the Islamic Banking Act. In addition to allowing Islamic banks, the 
Islamic Banking Act permitted existing financial institutions to offer Islamic services 
in addition to their traditional products, largely, according to the Malaysian 
government, to make such services as widely available as possible in Malaysia in the 
least amount of time.   
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As a result of this phenomenon, conventional banks in Malaysia began to 
offer “Islamic windows” at local branches, in which purely Islamic financial services 
were offered next to similar teller windows providing the bank’s traditional line of 
financial products and services.48  This led to a departure from other environments 
found in countries that practiced Islamic Banking (i.e. Iran and Pakistan) insomuch as 
it was seen as viable for a bank to offer Islamic financial products as a supplement to 
pre-existing business models, instead of being required to specialise in Islamic 
services alone.  This concept has hence been expanded by some banks in creation of 
parallel Islamic banks or Islamic divisions (e.g. RHB Islamic, HSBC Amanah). 
Consequently, major players in Malaysia’s Islamic financial landscape have largely 
become reflective of the conventional banking industry, and major multinationals 
such as the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, or HSBC, have become 
the main providers of Islamic financial services in the country. 
Towards new regulatory structures 
 
With the proliferation of institutions providing financial services in an Islamic 
manner, oversight was required for coordination and standardisation of Islamic 
financial services. Hence, in 1997 Bank Negara Malaysia founded the Shariah 
Advisory Council, the highest Shariah advisory body in the country.49 Pursuant to 
this, the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia (IBFIM) was founded in 
2001 to liaise between the Shariah Advisory Council and individual banks in 
implementation of compliance, as well as to provide training for Islamic financial 
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managers in ensuring that all financial products adhere to Islamic principles.  These 
developments have generally led to Malaysia positioning itself among the most 
developed states in terms of Islamic financial infrastructure in the current global 
economy. 
This development, over time, has led to an increase in global interest in 
Malaysia’s Islamic Finance industry. However, prior to the end of 2004, the industry 
was still highly regulated and largely limited to existing Malaysian financial entities. 
Change came in late 2004 when Bank Negara Malaysia announced its intention to 
license new players in the Islamic financial market, resulting in a plethora of 
applications for new institutions to be established. Among the key international 
players entering the fold, Kuwait Finance House and Qatar Islamic Bank were among 
the most prominent.50 
Links to the Middle East; a leader in Islamic bonds 
 
The participation of these two players is particularly more significant given 
the fact that an increasing amount of capital infused into Malaysia’s Islamic financial 
institutions and markets is sourced from the Middle East.51 While one may find this 
linkage to be largely driven by religious links between Malaysia and the Middle East, 
a greater amount of emphasis on this linkage must be placed on the burgeoning 
wealth of Middle Eastern countries, correlated with an overall upward trend in global 
oil prices. This, if taken into context, implies an interest in ‘tapping into’ the 
economic prosperity of the Middle East, and, inherently, in transforming Malaysia 
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into a hub for the ‘parking’ of revenues and other capital derived from ventures either 
related to or directly stemming from petroleum funds.  
In addition, Malaysia has become one of the world’s largest players in the 
global Sukuk bond market, attracting many corporations as a source of effective 
financing options, ostensibly due to the perceived reduction of risk associated with 
profit-sharing driven bonds as opposed to traditional interest-driven financing. This is 
due to the fact that, in general terms, the amount of liability for repayment is reduced 
as Sukuk bonds are linked to the proceeds from a venture once operational. When 
compared with ownership of a traditional bond, a Sukuk bond holder is not trading in 
debt, as essentially he or she is given ownership of part of the venture in question, as 
opposed to being promised payment for the loaning of an amount of money.  
The aforementioned flexibility described has led some multinational 
corporations seeing Sukuk as a potentially attractive means of raising capital, with 
perhaps a significant example of this being Nestlé’s $184 million, seven-year Islamic 
bond flotation on the Malaysian market. Furthering the increasingly global nature of 
Islamic Finance, this offer was managed by HSBC, a leading multinational bank 
which has only become an Islamic player in recent years.52 
As Malaysia continues to liberalise its financial markets and allow more 
investment, the Islamic Banking sector of its economy looks set to continue to grow 
significantly. This growth has the potential to create significant challenges, benefits, 
and developments in Malaysia. In fact, the effects of Islamic Banking, as this thesis 
will show, have the potential to influence not only the role of Islam in Malaysian 
society, but also its economic and political dynamics. 
                                                 






Since its beginning in 1982, as discussed in Chapter 3, Malaysia’s Islamic 
Banking sector has become increasingly prominent, both locally and in the 
international Islamic financial marketplace. Malaysia’s experience, largely shaped by 
a rapidly liberalising regulatory environment, unique financial products, an upsurge in 
international capital inflows, and a favourable political environment, allows for a 
unique perspective on Islamic Finance development. Each of the aforementioned 
factors is critical to understanding the nature of the country’s Islam-based financial 
sector, knowledge of which will elucidate discourse on motivations and ramifications 
of the sector in the Federation’s contemporary socio-political dialectic. 
Ascendancy through liberalisation 
 
While Malaysia’s original Islamic Banking sector was relatively small in scope 
and stature, the changes that have taken place in the industry since the year 2000 are 
particularly significant, given the high level of liberalisation. This liberalisation was, 
however, largely focused on Islamic Banking alone.53 This development gives 
credence to the notion that Islamic Banking in itself was categorised and promoted by 
itself, autonomous from the rest of Malaysia’s financial sector.  
Unique to Malaysia’s case, collaboration between Malaysian banks and 
multinational banking entities has been a focus of the Federation’s effort to become 
one of the world’s Islamic financial centres.  In this respect, the Malaysian 
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government’s opening up of its Islamic financial sector through granting new Islamic 
licenses outside its ten domestic “anchor banks” proved especially significant, as 
none of these banks had ever ventured into Islamic products before.54  
The expansion of licensed Islamic financial providers in 2004 largely followed 
an acceleration of the Malaysian “Financial Services Master Plan” which was 
designed to support the country’s dual aims of increasing its stature as an 
international financial centre and having Islamic financial products and services 
account for 20% of all deposits in the financial sector.55  At the conclusion of the 
licensing expansion, the following banks offered financial services in addition to their 
conventional services: 
Table 1. Conventional Banks offering Islamic Products, 2006. 
Alliance Bank Malaysia 
Bhd. 
Citibank Bhd. 




OCBC Bank (Malaysia) 
Bhd. 
Public Bank Bhd. 
Southern Bank Bhd. 
Standard Chartered Bank 
Malaysia Bhd. 
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, 200656 
 
At the same time, the following purely Islamic banks were operating within Malaysia: 
Table 2. Islamic Banks in Malaysia, 2006. 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment 
Corporation (Malaysia) Bhd. 
Affin Islamic Bank Bhd. 
AmIslamic Bank Bhd. Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd. 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bhd. CIMB Islamic Bank Bhd. 
EONCAP Islamic Bank Bhd. Hong Leong Islamic Bank Bhd. 
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Bhd. RHB Islamic Bank Bhd. 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, 200657 
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As the charts above reflect, the growth of Islamic Banking in Malaysia has been 
significant, largely as a result of regulatory liberalisation. In addition to increasing the 
number of Islamic banks, the array of services provided has significantly increased, 
going beyond traditional financing services to include Sukuk bonds and Takaful 
insurance. Both financial products, while initially subject to scepticism on the part of 
many individuals and institutions alike, have become widely respected and popular 
products both in Malaysia and abroad.  In fact, the popularity of Islamic financial 
products in Malaysia alone has been such that, in fact, the majority of individuals 
within Malaysia who utilise Islamic products and services are in fact non-Muslim.58 
New products for an expanding market 
 
Among the most popular and new financial products in the Malaysian Islamic 
sector, the creation of Islamic credit cards and mortgages were perhaps the most 
innovative. The source of this innovation comes from an Islamic credit card being 
based on marginal deferred payment principles, in which the amount of credit is 
linked to the price of an asset which the bank agrees to purchase for the debtor and 
sell back at an increased price in instalments. For example, a bank will buy an item 
requested through the use of the credit card, then bill the client for the price of this 
item plus an agreed margin, say 10%, and then divide repayment into monthly 
increments. These arrangements are then linked with the MasterCard and Visa 
financial networks, creating an Islamic credit card.  
Bank Islam’s creation of a card is important because it was one of the first 
Islamic institutions to do so. On top of this, the creation of Bank Islam’s card is 
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unique as most of Islamic banks have found it challenging to create such products 
aside from normal deposits and loans.59 Despite being linked to Visa and MasterCard 
networks, the card does, at least in theory, remain interest-free. This is because the 
linkage agreement is similar to the arrangement in which debit cards are linked to 
Visa and MasterCard networks, hence avoiding interest, as the profits made by this 
linkage take the forms of administrative fees, not interest itself. However, it must be 
noted that some Islamic scholars, notably in the Persian Gulf, find the nature of the 
Bank Islam Malaysia credit card to be ‘un-Islamic’.60 
The rise of Islamic corporate banking 
 
Of more interest and importance to the Islamic financial sector, the increasing 
level of capital inflows from the Middle East, particularly members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, has led more emphasis to be placed on corporate and high-level 
banking services, including wealth management. The emphasis on gleaning capital 
from the Middle East has been a two-sided exchange, with both Malaysia seeking 
funds from the burgeoning, oil-rich states of the Gulf, and GECC members seeking to 
diversify their holdings and investments outside of their own region.61 
Malaysia has been largely successful in attracting such capital, as many 
potential investors from this region view the country as a favourable place to conduct 
business, both because of the Islamic nature of its investment opportunities as well as 
the decreased likelihood of interference and freezing of assets. Concerns over such 
                                                 
59 Bank Islam Malaysia, “About Bank Islam Card,” [online] 2007; available at 
http://www.bankislam.com.my/cms/default.asp?cms_articleID=15&languageID=0 
60 “Can a Credit Card Ever Be Halal?” Middle East Banker [online] 2003; available at 
http://www.bankerme.com/bme/2003/mar/islamic_banking.asp 
61 Razli Ramli, Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia, interview by author, 10 August 2006, 
Kuala Lumpur, from notes. 
31 
punitive measures towards capital have heightened since the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, as scrutiny over anonymous and private banking entities, such as 
those in the EU and Switzerland has dramatically increased.  
Inflows of capital from the Middle East 
 
Middle Eastern expansion into Malaysia’s Islamic Finance industry has come to 
fruition through investments made under various consortia in Islamic financial 
institutions. Recently, Kuwait Finance House, Unicorn Islamic Bank of Bahrain, and 
other Middle Eastern entities have created an increasingly significant footprint in 
Malaysia in terms of ventures.  These ventures commonly originate with local Islamic 
financial institutions, and expand into acquisitions or proposals for augmentation by 
takeovers or partnerships with conventional banking enterprises.  Kuwait Finance 
House, for example, in early 2007 came close to acquiring the RHB Finance Group, 
one of Malaysia’s largest commercial banks (as well as a leader in Islamic services).62 
Furthermore, many Middle Eastern financial institutions have become 
particularly involved in Islamic Banking in Malaysia through services such as 
floating bond issues in Malaysia’s sukuk, or Islamic bond market. One of the first 
major issues was in 2002, when the Malaysian government released the Malaysia 
Global Sukuk bond series in order to raise funds for the renovation and improvement 
of several government facilities. The bond, based in Labuan, was managed by a 
consortium of banks, including Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, and 
the Islamic Development Bank, all key Middle Eastern players in Islamic Finance.63 
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The importance of this bond was the fact that it was one of the first international 
public debt offerings made in an Islamic context, as opposed to domestically-oriented 
Government Investment Issues (GICs) offered previously by the Malaysian 
government. 
Islamic Banking and liquidity 
 
In addition to these benefits, Islamic Banking is perceived to overcome some 
limitations of conventional banking, such as a need to adhere to Basel core principles 
regarding liquidity. The Basel core principles refer to a series of recommendations 
created by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, created by the central bank 
governors of the G-10 grouping of Nations (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States). These recommendations aim to standardise international regulations 
as to the amount of liquid capital banks must keep on hand to guard against financial 
and operational risks.64 
Many Islamic banks, because of the profit sharing nature of their enterprises, 
maintain a lower level of liquid capital that can be withdrawn from banks at any 
given time compared to a conventional institution. Decreased liquidity requirements 
would hence be reflective of the fact that individuals or entities investing in an 
Islamic product would be largely engaging in profit sharing, which would imply 
either fixed-term deposits or increased risk which might preclude quick withdrawals. 
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However, this advantage may be increasingly diminished as Islamic institutions 
become more entrenched within global financial networks.65  
Another solution to liquidity has also been attempted by Bank Negara Malaysia 
in creating an Islamic money market which allows for Inter-bank transfers on a profit-
sharing rather than interest-driven basis, permitting Islamic banks access to a halal 
lender of last resort.66 In any event, most Islamic Banks are known to possess a 
reasonably high level of liquidity, and this issue has not yet been practically explored 
to any significant extent.67 
Noteworthy success and results 
 
Increased interest in Islamic financial services has resulted in Islamic Banking 
becoming a multi-billion ringgit industry, with deposits in Malaysia alone amounting 
to RM85.2 billion (insurance assets alone through Takaful reaching RM4.6 billion) in 
2004. The inflows of capital, of which this figure is reflective, imply that Malaysia’s 
Islamic sector has achieved significance both in terms of overall capital as well as 
market share within Malaysia itself. This amount constituted roughly 10% of the total 
deposits within the country, with another 6 years before the target date of 2010 for 
Malaysian Islamic assets to total 20% of all deposits.68   
Islamic Banking in Malaysia, therefore, has become profitable far beyond just 
traditional financial services. RHB Islamic Bank, which will be cited because of the 
clarity of its annual reports, reported a net profit of RM36.9 million for the first half 
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of 200669. Among the bank’s assets, RM1.3 billion of RM3.9 billion of total finance 
assets were derived from Islamic mortgages alone.70 Such profitability and the 
popularity of Islamic banks and their services set Malaysia apart from other Islamic 
financial environments. Those found in Iran and Pakistan, for example dictate that all 
banks within the country operate within an Islamic context.  
 This profitability is largely reflective of the dual banking system that the 
Federation operates, which allows for Islamic Banking to take hold within the country 
through competitive means. One may see this in contrast to the statutory enforcement 
and imposition of Islamic Banking upon the populations of Iran and Pakistan, where 
the mandatory nature of Islamic services71 would imply a lack of competitiveness and 
a need to innovate. The need for Islamic institutions to compete with one another and 
against traditional financial players, which form the bulk of the banking sector, has 
itself spurred much of the dynamism seen today in Malaysian Islamic Finance.  
Political influences in the Islamic sector 
 
With the increased viability and expansion of the Islamic services industry, a 
significant amount of political pressure and influence has been placed on the sector. 
Politicians, particularly from the ruling UMNO party, have emphasized Islamic 
Banking in promoting Islamic values amongst the majority Malay-Muslim population 
of the Federation. This emphasis is largely reflective of the race-driven nature of 
politics within Malaysia. Communal identities largely dictate the lines upon which 
political parties are drawn, with the noted exception of a few opposition parties such 
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as the Democratic Action Party (DAP), which emphasises a race-blind political 
discourse.72 
UMNO has continued to shore up its legitimacy as a protector and promoter of 
Malay rights and values. Such values have been promulgated through a vision of 
Islam-driven development, one which is supplemented with the political ideologies of 
Islam Hadhari and Vision 2020. Both concepts encourage Malaysia’s attainment of 
developed-nation status by 2020 within a non-Western and Islam-driven context.73 
The origins of this idea link directly back to the tenure of Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad 
as Prime Minister of Malaysia, from 1980 to 2004. The Mahathir period witnessed 
the creation of projects and companies which were meant to develop Malaysia’s 
financial and industrial infrastructure and to spur further development on a large 
scale, involving significant government control and investment.  
While these policies were sometimes criticised as being mired in cronyism and 
corruption, as well as being an extension of Mahathir’s largely authoritarian 
administration, the result of these projects was an improvement in many sectors, 
including banking. These developments allowed for Islamic financial institutions to 
gradually expand from Mahathir’s own state-sanctioned creation of the sector. In fact, 
the existence of Islamic Banking in Malaysia was only facilitated by the 1983 Islamic 
Banking act, which allowed for exclusively Islamic banks to operate outside 
traditional models of banking services. Therefore, the development and popularity of 
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Islamic Banking may be seen to be a derivative of UMNO’s political agenda in 
developing Malaysia while consolidating its own political position. 
The importance of the Islamic bond market 
 
Aside from general Islamic Banking services, one of the largest and fastest-
growing segments of the Islamic financial sector is the Islamic bond, or sukuk market. 
As mentioned before, one of the major offerings that has been issued is the Malaysian 
Global Sukuk, which serves as a good example as to the nature of Islamic bonds in 
Malaysia, both in form and function.  The Global Sukuk was structured around the 
sale, through bonds, of parcels of land to investors through the bond issue, for the 
duration of which the government will make rental payments equivalent to semi-
annual distribution amounts stipulated in the issue. Upon the maturity of the bond, the 
government would re-purchase the property at the face value of the bond issue; hence, 
the value of the bond is secured and the bond not subject to fluctuations linked to real 
estate pricing.  As the bond was guaranteed by the Malaysian government, it was 
equivalent in nature to sovereign debt, and hence rated accordingly by various 
brokerage firms.74   
Creating an Islamic Finance hub 
The convergence of all these areas in Malaysian Islamic Finance, with global as 
well as regional participants, coupled with the wide array of Islamic financial services 
provided in the Federation has led to Malaysia’s emergence as a leading Islamic 
financial centre. Proof of this lies in that US$30 billion of US$41 billion in Islamic 
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bonds issued worldwide have been created in Malaysia.75 This ascendancy directly 
relates to Malaysia’s Capital Market Master Plan, which has set out guidelines for 
ensuring the continuation of the country’s comparative advantage in the Islamic 
Banking sector. It also has called for broadening the variety of services available to 
consumers as well as ensuring effective regulatory and administrative frameworks in 
which the market might flourish.76  
A favourable regulatory environment 
 
Malaysia has taken the building of its Islamic financial credentials a step further 
than mere planning, with attractive incentives for Islamic financial institutions.  
According to Price Waterhouse Coopers, aside from granting new licenses in Islamic 
Banking and Insurance (Takaful), the country has created significant tax incentives 
have been infused into the Islamic sector. These allow for exemption from income tax 
for all institutions which offer Islamic financial products in foreign currencies (non-
ringgit transactions).77 In addition, all profits received by foreigners through Islamic 
and conventional banking methods would also be tax-exempt, a departure from the 
previous regulation which allowed such profits to be tax-free only if they were 
derived from conventional banking sources. Corporate finance has also been included 
in the incentives package, with corporate partnership agreements, largely funded 
under profit-loss-sharing agreements, exempt from having to file taxes. Finally, a 
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20% discount on the stamp duty will be afforded for all National Shariah Board 
compliant Islamic financial products.78 
In itself, the scope and nature of these incentives are such that they place 
Malaysia in the forefront of Islamic Banking and financial services, generally 
outshining competitors in other countries.79 What is ironic about such an emphasis on 
Islamic Banking is that Malaysia in itself is perhaps the most heterogeneous of any 
country actively engaging in Islamic Banking on any large scale. Because of its 
demographics, one might assume that market potential, particularly in the retail 
sector, would be more extensive in countries with virtually all of whose populations 
are practitioners of Islam.  
The position of Malaysia at the centre of Islamic Finance is a testament to the 
amount of effort and emphasis placed on the Malaysian government in promoting the 
Islamic financial services industry, as well as the nature of finance in Malaysia itself 
(the strength of which may be largely facilitated by the relatively developed nature of 
Malaysia’s financial infrastructure, an area which will be discussed later in the 
thesis.) While Islamic Banking in Malaysia has developed into a sizeable portion of 
the local financial landscape, and Malaysia is largely seen as a global leader in the 
Islamic Finance industry, the reasons for the emergence of this sector transcend facts 
and figures. One must approach the motivations of parties involved in the Islamic 
Finance industry in order effectively and reasonably to understand the ascendancy of 
Islamic Banking in Malaysia’s economic, political and social spheres.  
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CHAPTER V: 
ISLAMIC BANKING FOR PIETY 
 
 
Islamic Banking is, as its nomenclature suggests, more than just another 
derivative of banking and financial networks. As a religiously-based economic 
system, Islamic Banking must negotiate its way through the principles of its faith.  In 
this case, the banking system must adhere to the principles outlined in the Qur’an and 
Sunnah pertaining to the business and trade practices of a good Muslim. However, 
Islam itself is not a homogeneous religion, and Islamic Banking is no different.  
Islam allows for ijtihad or creative re-interpretation of Islamic principles to fit 
time and place, and a derivative of this interpretive process, taqlid. This latter concept 
refers to imitating the dictates of previous, established Islamic scholars when 
analysing sacred texts in a modern environment. Mainly because of these two 
concepts, differences of opinion and conflict arise as to how Islamic Banking should 
work. Malaysia, in particular, has a more lenient atmosphere reflected in its less 
stringent norms of dress and greater gender equality when compared to other Muslim 
countries, particularly Wahabbi-influenced states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar.80 In 
general, the Federation can be said to provide greater flexibility to Muslims seeking a 
pious lifestyle. Operating with a relatively lenient interpretation of Islam, Malaysia 
has utilised such diversity of thought to innovate new financial products. At the same 
time, whether or not innovation is sustainable in the face of potential conflict with 
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investors from the Middle East, which generally adheres to a more stringent form of 
the religion, remains to be seen. 
Understanding Islam 
 
To get a better picture of discussions surrounding Islamic Banking, it is 
helpful to explain the concepts being employed in theological debates on acceptable 
practices within Islamic Banking. The chief sources of Islamic moral guidance are the 
Qur’an and Sunnah. The Qur’an, Islam’s holy book represents the chief source of 
guidance for Muslims. This is supplemented by the lesser known Sunnah, which acts 
as a history of the life and teachings of the Prophet Mohammed, and is considered, 
like the Qur’an, to be an essential component of the practice of Islam.81 It is 
important, however, to note that the Qur’an is considered infallible by Muslims, 
while the Sunnah is not. Both texts provide one with the philosophical basis for 
Islamic Finance, and the underlying challenges which the industry as a whole 
attempts to overcome.  
Hadith and ijtihad 
 
Of particular interest within the framework of the Qur’an and Sunnah are two 
concepts which play heavily into the modern evolution of the Islamic Finance 
industry. These are Hadith and ijtihad, the former concerning individual passages 
included in Sunnah literature, and the latter pertaining to the creative interpretation of 
Islamic precepts. Both have important roles, and are highly interconnected. 
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Hadiths, which are individual stories, are particularly important as they relate 
to oral traditions reflecting upon the alleged mannerisms and ways of the Prophet 
Mohammed.82 In some instances, these traditions serve as a bridge in understanding 
the proper way to execute Islamic ideals in everyday life. However, Hadiths are 
controversial as many traditions exist, and the interpretation and validity of various 
Hadiths are open to debate. Even with the debates surrounding the validity of many 
passages, the Sunnah, which is the collective phrase referring to all Hadiths, is still 
regarded as being an integral aspect of a truly Islamic lifestyle, as the principles of 
Hadith texts are confirmed through the consensus of the Prophet Mohammed’s 
companions.83  
The second concept, ijtihad, is more philosophical in nature, and, in many 
Islamic traditions, is considered an anachronism. The process of ijtihad refers to the 
creative interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah by Islamic scholars. This 
interpretation then results in judicial precedents which form the basis of Shari’ah, or 
Islamic law. In Sunni Islam (which dominates Malaysia’s Muslim population), ijtihad 
was traditionally only practiced by highly-trained scholars, many of whom specialise 
in a particular aspect of the Shari’ah.84 
It is important to clarify that some Islamic scholars and historians believe that 
ijtihad effectively ended around the beginning of the 10th century, as no new schools 
of Shari’ah law were founded after that point. However, reform-minded Islamic 
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scholars, beginning in the 19th Century, began to challenge this principle.85 
Scholarship also points to the fact that this was only a majority opinion, and some 
interpretation has continued since that point.86 Scholars who believe that ijtihad 
effectively ended in the 10th Century do, however, accept the notion of taqlid, which 
implies the imitation of ijtihad scholars.87 Taqlid, in this respect, is quite similar to 
the idea of judges interpreting new cases by means of precedent in a secular 
environment.  
The convergence of Hadith and ijtihad allows for a wide spectrum of thought 
and interpretation in the application of Islamic principles in every day life. Because of 
such variance, banks operating as ‘Islamic’ ones can make many different products 
and services available. Much of the variety in services is dependent upon the country 
in which Islamic institutions operate and the strain of Islamic philosophy prevalent in 
that area.  
Diversity and divergence 
 
The most outstanding example of how Islamic banks can vary from place to 
place is seen in their regulation according to Shari’ah, or Islamic law. For example, in 
a comparative study of Islamic Banking in eleven Muslim countries, Sudin Haron 
found that Malaysia was the only country in which Arabic words are used in 
describing all Shari’ah principles used for governance. The author also found a 
significant divergence in the number of Islamic principles to which different banks 
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adhered, generally ranging from 12 to 14. 88 An example of this diversity is in 
comparing Pakistan to Malaysia in terms of loans. While Pakistan allows loans to be 
surcharged with service fees, Malaysian loans are generally devised with pre-
determined mark-up of the original principal.89 This is just one of the many ways that 
Islamic banks can vary, debunking any notion that all Islamic institutions are uniform.  
Morality and Investment 
 
Some areas do, however, represent points of consensus when determining 
what constitutes ‘Islamic’ business practices: It has been found to be necessary that, 
for a financial product or service to be considered Islamic, the types of businesses and 
ventures who either employ such products or receive capital from them must not 
engage in un-Islamic activity. Resulting from the necessity to keep Islamic funds 
‘clean’, ‘Islamic’ capital is generally prohibited from being invested in many 
traditional areas and industries.  
Among these areas, generally establishments producing, distributing, or 
providing goods typically categorised as haram, or forbidden, are excluded from the 
scope of Islamic investments. In practical terms, such categorisation often means that 
hotels, breweries, casinos, certain foodstuffs (most notably pork), nightclubs and 
some entertainment establishments cannot receive Islamic investment, both in the 
form of loans from banks, but also in terms of capital from Islamic bonds and other 
financing products. However, this can be ambiguous at times, particularly in areas 
such as construction. Future tenants of a building constructed through Islamic Finance 
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may engage in haram activities, hence leading some to question whether or not this, 
in the broadest sense, may be considered to be an ethical investment.90 
Guarantees of investment in morally sound areas does allow for Muslims to 
use banking services, and be assured that their capital is not being utilised to promote 
or distribute products or activities deemed haram under Islamic law. The ability to 
invest in a morally sound environment is particularly relevant on the retail level of 
Islamic Banking. In this market, Islamic institutions must distinguish themselves from 
commercial banks beyond mere nomenclature differences. It is, perhaps, when 
competing for individual clients on matters other than return or payback rate that 
Islamic Banking truly must stand apart from conventional banking practices.  
Not without controversy 
 
Given the fact that Islam is marked by such a divergence of opinion, and 
Islamic Banking by different policies and practices, it is not surprising that what 
various individuals and groups consider ‘halal’ or allowed can be controversial and 
the subject of scorn. For example, on the issue of derivatives (that is, the buying and 
selling of contracts for goods not yet existent), a heated exchange developed at a 
conference in Malaysia: 
If Islamic economics must make U-turns to remain in business, 
I suggest that we cut the whole crap and join mainstream riba 
[interest-driven] economics under the fiqh category of dharurah 
[necessity] and the modem criteria of efficiency. Perhaps [the 
previous commentator] should join the World Bank instead of 
remaining at [the Islamic Development Bank]. We should all 
then adopt the Turkish Islam and read the English Qur'an and 
convert the Islamic banks into the global conventional 
finance players. All Islamic business should be profit maximizing, 
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speculation should be made halal in the name of survival, 
and zakat and waqf can be turned over to the mullahs 
to administer as they are no longer the cornerstones of the 
Islamic economy. May Allah help us if this is the trajectory 
(the ultimate surrender) Islamic economists and obsolete 
faqihs are taking us.91 
 
Such controversies are not rare: Another contentious issue is the notion of 
murabaha, commonly referred to as cost-plus financing. In this arrangement, the bank 
purchases an item for a patron and then sells it back to him with a pre-arranged 
surcharge, with payment of the total sum then divided into instalments.92 This notion 
is extremely controversial as many Islamic scholars believe this to be the same as a 
fixed-interest loan, just with another name. In fact, given the nature of the agreement, 
there is no noticeable benefit to using such an arrangement in contrast to a traditional 
loan.93 
Another source of concern in Islamic Banking is the general spirit of Islamic 
banks in creating financial products. Critics allege that the majority of products 
offered by Islamic institutions are merely imitations of conventional products. 
Furthermore, Islamic Banking is seen to only be marketed towards those within 
Muslim societies that have some degree of liquid assets and a cognisance of the 
choices available in the global marketplace. The evolution of Islamic Finance into a 
somewhat elite-focused enterprise has led to what some argue is a culture in which 
Islamic banks merely strive to overcome Shari’ah obstacles, or, in vernacular, to 
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“work the system” instead of trying to create truly Muslim products.94 Even Zeti 
Akhtar Aziz, Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, was quoted as saying that: 
The Shariah should always be viewed as an enabler to innovation and 
creativity, rather than a constraint. Efforts, therefore, need to be 
enhanced to fully appreciate and maximize the true potential and 
wisdom of the Shariah.95 
 
This debate broadens further as to whether or not the Islamic system truly exists 
at all. For example, Timur Kuran argues that the Islamic economic system merely 
presents a package of many inconsistent ideas and policies.96 While such 
inconsistencies might exist, one could argue that Islamic Banking’s current status is a 
result of its relative youth in terms of development, particularly when compared with 
the conventional banking system. Banks in the interest-driven sphere have, in contrast 
to Islamic ones, had centuries to develop, while Islamic Banking in its modern form 
only truly began in the 1960s. 
Although the divergences in opinion and controversies depicted above can serve 
to portray a somewhat negative light on Islamic Banking, this diversity has also 
proven advantageous, especially in the case of Malaysia. Because of the lack of a 
universal series of principles applied to Islamic institutions worldwide, Malaysia has 
developed its own system of controls, as well as substantial resources in training and 
consultancy. Furthermore, Malaysia benefits from the fact that the strain of Islam 
prevalent amongst its citizens is one of moderation, a fact reflected in rhetoric from 
Malaysia’s leaders. 
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Moderation and Modernity 
 
A good example of Islamic moderation is found in the communications of 
Prime Minister Abdullah Bin Hajji Ahmad Badawi, himself an Islamic scholar, at the 
Seminar on the 10-Year Master Plan for the Islamic Financial Services Industry. 
Prime Minister Abdullah’s linkage of Islamic Development to the evisceration of 
terrorism and extremism in Muslim Societies, with a particular emphasis on social 
justice, is indicative of a progressive form of Islam, one which respects diversity of 
thought.97 Abdullah is quoted as saying: 
I believe that we can address the problems of extremism and terrorism 
by delivering better and more widespread development. It is only by 
promoting economic progress and by ensuring the fruits of development 
are shared by all, that we can make advancements in political, social, 
cultural and religious fields. Economic success is a major factor in 
raising the stature and dignity of the Muslim World, and in uplifting our 
political standing and voice at the Global level.98 
 
While one might be cynical in accepting much of the Prime Minister’s rhetoric 
for face value, Abdullah’s commitment to social justice has been acknowledged even 
prior to his appointment to the premiership.99 This commitment can also be seen in 
his government’s priorities, which have markedly shifted away from emphasis on 
mega-projects such as infrastructure to development initiatives targeted at improving 
quality of life for ordinary Malaysians.100 
This progressive stance has resulted in a spirit of innovation in Malaysia which 
is generally not matched in other areas which practice Islamic Banking. Training 
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institutions and schools, such as the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia 
(IBFIM) and International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) provide experts in 
almost every aspect of Islamic Banking.101 Also, and perhaps controversially, 
Malaysia has a somewhat “cowboy” attitude to creating products which adhere to 
Shari’ah law, attempting to develop items first and ensure their compliance 
afterwards. The “ask forgiveness instead of permission” doctrine in Islamic Banking 
is epitomized by the statement of Mr. Razli Ramli of the Islamic Banking and 
Finance Institute Malaysia (IBFIM), who believes that the main advantage of 
Malaysia is its “try first” attitude.102 
The results of Malaysia’s way of managing Islamic institutions are compelling: 
As of June 2004, assets managed within Islamic institutions in Malaysia stood at 
US$23.45 billion, accounting for 10 percent of all assets in Malaysia’s banks.103 
Furthermore, of US$41 billion in Islamic bonds issued since 1996, US$30 billion 
have been issued in Malaysia.104 These results, according to the Malaysian 
government, are indicative of the Federation’s quick emergence as a global hub for 
Islamic Banking and financial services.105 
However, with this emergence, questions arise as to whether or not Malaysia 
can continue its liberal approach to Islamic jurisprudence when creating financial 
products. Key to the growth of Malaysia’s Islamic sector has been funds from 
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investors from petrodollar-rich Persian Gulf states.106 While Malaysia does share the 
Islamic faith with this potential target audience, the strain of Islam practiced in the 
Gulf is characterised by more stringent Islamic jurisprudence and interpretations of 
Halal practices.107 Whether or not this will influence Malaysia in the long run 
remains to be seen, although, at the time of the submission of this thesis, this aspect 
of the Malaysian system seems to work to its advantage.  
Piety and the Periphery 
 
The religious element of Islamic Banking takes on new importance when 
contextualized within the geographic periphery of the state. In Malaysia’s instance, 
Islamic Banking’s social messages are particularly important in rural areas and small 
towns, where the operations of the sector are almost completely retail. Much of rural 
Malaysia, particularly on the eastern seaboard of the Malay Peninsula, has been the 
heart of conservative Islam in the confederation. Such an emphasis on conservative 
Islam has been reflected  in the success of Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) against the 
governing United Malays National Organisation in local elections. Islamic Banking, 
as will be discussed in later chapters, forges a merger of religion and politics which is 
particularly relevant in such peripheral areas. 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, Islam’s diversity of thought continues to be a key factor in the 
development of Islamic Banking. This debate, facilitated by the theological 
institutions concerned with interpreting Islamic texts, has led to heated arguments and 
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questions as to the legitimacy of the Islamic Banking enterprise as a whole. This same 
debate, however, has allowed Malaysia to lead the pack of countries introducing and 
developing Islamic Banking as a key part of their economic plans and, though the 
differences in opinions regarding what is ‘Islamic’ may prove detrimental in the long 
run, the Federation, at this point, continues to benefit tremendously from its 
progressive Islamic philosophy and practices. 
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CHAPTER VI: 
ISLAMIC BANKING FOR PROFIT 
 
 
Aside from religious motivations, one of the key areas of Islamic Banking 
which makes it attractive is its profitability. Currently, many countries are expanding 
their Islamic Banking sectors due to the possibilities for profit that Muslim-friendly 
finance provides. Malaysia, due to its extensive history with Islamic Banking, 
geographic proximity to both the Middle East and East Asia, and sophistication of 
institutions, looks set to continue to profit substantially from Islamic Banking’s 
ascendance.    
Islamic Banking, in its current sense, is a truly international enterprise. Islamic 
banks exist throughout the Islamic world, in places as diverse as Dubai, Bangladesh, 
and even the United Kingdom. Nations without sizeable Muslim populations are also 
taking note. The Federal Reserve of the United States, for example, has courted 
Islamic Banking, and has made it clear it is open to allowing Islamic institutions to 
operate within its current regulatory framework.108 The United Kingdom has also 
announced that it will provide tax incentives for Islamic financial institutions, hoping 
to obtain a portion of what seems to be an ever-expanding industry. There is now a 
Dow Jones Islamic index, which monitors countries which engage in Islam-friendly 
investment, and shy away from traditionally haram, or forbidden activities.109 
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More than a niche market 
 
Given these developments, it may be asserted that Islamic Banking is 
emerging to be more than just a niche system of financial products and services. 
Particularly in a post-9/11 World, where Muslim investors, wary of potential freezes 
and scrutiny from authorities in the West, seek to diversify their investments, the 
prospect of Islamic accounts looks particularly attractive.110 
Of the many countries which are attempting to create viable Islamic financial 
sectors, Malaysia truly stands out. The country’s share of Islamic funds is significant 
and becoming increasingly strong, especially when concerning the issue of Islamic 
debt. At the end of 2004, the Islamic bond market’s size stood at RM363 billion or 
81% of GDP.111 Of the US$41 billion in Islamic bonds issued between 1996 and 
2006, US$30 billion was issued in Malaysia alone.112 
Experience and Expertise 
 
The credit for these outstanding figures may be seen to largely lie with the 
level of experience Malaysia has in Islamic Banking. Although the Islamic sector 
started small in the Federation, Malaysia has had a continuously operating Islamic 
financial system since 1983. Consequently, the existence of an Islamic infrastructure 
over such a relatively long period of time has placed it ahead of regional and 
international competitors in terms of expertise, personnel and institutional 
development.  
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As has been mentioned previously, Malaysia’s Islamic sector benefits from a 
relatively lenient interpretation of Shari’ah jurisprudence. Such a liberal 
understanding of religious ideals has allowed for innovations that might not come to 
fruition in a more stringent environment. The source of much of these innovations has 
been Malaysia’s extensive pool of individuals with expertise on Islamic Finance and 
its practical applications. Many if not most of these persons have attended one of the 
Federation’s main educational institutions which have programmes dedicated to 
Islamic Finance. The two most prominent of these institutions is the Institute of 
Islamic Banking and Finance Malaysia (IBFIM) and the Islamic Finance Programme 
of the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM).  
Exporting knowledge and know-how 
 
It is, perhaps, noteworthy that Malaysia has not only provided talents for the 
local market, but has also exported its expertise overseas. In my own personal 
interview with Mr. Razli Ramli of the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute 
Malaysia (IBFIM), I ascertained that many key principals in Islamic financial 
institutions worldwide either obtained qualifications from or received training at a 
Malaysian educational entity.113 A prominent example of this trend is the case of 
Amer Bukvic, an IIUM graduate, who heads Bosna Bank International, Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s first Islamic Bank.114 
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Sophisticated training and personnel development 
 
IBFIM itself offers a prominent example of the level of sophistication that 
Malaysia has achieved in developing its Islamic Finance training institutions. While 
IBFIM is focused on training entry-level professionals, its facilities and courses 
provide the foundation of a training apparatus which engages in human resource 
development on all levels of expertise and management. For example, while IBFIM 
deals largely with fairly introductory training, the International Centre for Education 
in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) largely deals with professional certifications and 
executive development. In addition, while IBFIM has certificate programmes, 
INCEIF has plans to create a Ph.D. programme in Islamic Finance.115 
The development of these institutions has also been heavily co-ordinated with 
leading Islamic institutions in Malaysia. As the proceeding table shows, in the case of 
IBFIM, virtually every major Islamic service provider maintains a shareholder 
presence within the organisation: 
Table 3. Shareholding Institutions in IBFIM 
Bank Negara Malaysia 
Bhd. 
Affin Bank Bhd. 
Alliance Bank Malaysia 
Bhd. 
AmMerchant Bank Bhd. 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia 
Bhd. 
BIMB Holdings (Bank 
Islam Malaysia) Bhd. 
EON Bank Bhd. 




Public Bank Bhd. RHB Islamic Bank Bhd. Southern Bank Bhd. 
Takaful Nasional Bhd.   
Source: IBFIM presentation, 1 September 2006, Kuala Lumpur.116 
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The development of IBFIM represents a showcase of the evolution of Islamic 
Banking since the mid-1990s, when the industry was still monopolised by one single 
entity, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). When the institute was founded in 
1995, IBFIM was entirely owned by Bank Islam. Training in the institute was 
provided exclusively for Bank Islam employees, and focused on introducing new 
staffers to the concepts and principles underlying the bank’s offering of financial 
services. The exclusivity of the organisation changed, however, in 2001, 
corresponding with the liberalisation of the Islamic Banking to include ‘Islamic 
windows,’ in which a conventional bank would be able to offer Islamic services 
alongside its normal interest-driven products.117  
The change that took place in IBFIM provided an opening to conventional and 
new Islamic banks to take a stake in the institution’s governance. The shift to a 
broader-focused organisation also changed the nature of services offered by the 
institute. Training was expanded to include continuing education and skills-based 
instruction, from just introductory training during its time as a BIMB organ. In terms 
of other services, the institute has increasingly taken on a consultancy role, helping to 
assist banks in ensuring the highest possible levels of Shari’ah compliance in 
accordance with the principles set down by Malaysia’s National Shari’ah Advisory 
Board.118 
The level of engagement with the banking community and government 
reflected in IBFIM’s transformation in the past decade has, as part of a greater 
emphasis towards expanding the Islamic financial industry in Malaysia, allowed for a 




more lenient environment in which banks might operate. A primary reason for the 
increased ease of operation is the augmented supply of qualified professionals able to 
both manage Islamic financial institutions but, as importantly, create and promote 
new and innovative products within the Islamic framework. The creation of this pool 
of talent, it may be argued, represents one of the key areas that has made Malaysia’s 
expanding and increasingly profitable Islamic sector possible, surpassing longer-
entrenched sectors in other countries. 
Increased commitment from government 
 
Importantly, around the time that IBFIM was transformed, an increased 
governmental awareness and presence began to be found in the Islamic financial 
industry. The increased presence of the government can again be ascertained through 
the organisational structure of IBFIM, in which Bank Negara holds a special stake. 
Also, the governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, the Federation’s central bank, is 
concurrently chairman of IBFIM’s board of directors.119 
The government’s commitment is not only reflected in the transformation of 
the IBFIM but also in its Financial Market Master Plan, in which Islamic Banking is 
targeted to achieve 20% of market share within the Federation by 2010.120 This 
commitment to making Islamic Banking work from its inception stands in contrast to 
other regional Islamic countries, namely Brunei and Indonesia, both of whom have 
failed to prosper to the same extent, largely due to a lack of a solid commitment from 
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government in terms of legislation and the use of government resources to promote 
and familiarise society with the Islamic financial system.121 
An edge from geography 
 
Another key advantage which Malaysia has had and continued to exploit is its 
strategic geographic location between East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. The 
Federation’s placement between major financial centres such as Singapore and Hong 
Kong and countries with majority or sizeable minority Muslim populations has made 
doing business convenient in terms of time, and provided Islamic institutions with 
access to the superior financial infrastructure and networks found in Singapore and 
Hong Kong, as opposed to Kuala Lumpur.122 
Malaysia’s location also serves its benefit as the Middle East pays increasing 
attention to East Asia in terms of both investment opportunities as well as an 
increasingly significant source of trade.  
This is particularly true in current times, given the expansion of China as a 
major player in the global economy, both in terms of its exports but, more importantly 
to the Middle East, its increasing demand for oil. With an increasing surplus of 
revenue from the oil industry, investors from the Persian Gulf are now more likely to 
take a keen interest in Malaysia’s Islamic offerings.123 This fact has not been lost on 
the leadership of the Federation, which sees Islamic Banking as an integral part of a 
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greater plan to gain access to Middle Eastern money. These endeavours include 
tourism as well as banking services. 
The ability to differentiate 
 
Coinciding with the rising prosperity of China and the Middle East, Malaysia 
has found itself in a strategic position in which it is able to thrive and “shine”. 
Whereas, in the past, the Federation was overshadowed by more developed financial 
centres such as Singapore and Hong Kong, the emergence of Islamic Banking as a 
viable and profitable financial sector has propelled Malaysia into a position of global 
prominence. As has been shown in the previous discourse, a combination of historical 
experience, institutional development and geography have made Malaysia’s Islamic 
Banking sector an extremely profitable enterprise.  
The profits of the Federation’s Islamic enterprises, which exceed billions of 
dollars, and an outstanding level of market share have resulted in an augmentation of 
Malaysia’s significance on the world economic stage and within the Muslim world. 
This significance has also been coupled with an increasing fusion of government with 
Islamic Banking, with significant political implications in the Malaysian context. As 
will be discovered in the next chapter, the ramifications of Islamic Banking’s 
ascendancy are diverse and reflective of both the traditions and development of 
Malaysian society. Indeed, in the Malaysian context, profit has created many political 
outcomes, many of which will be discussed.  
59 
CHAPTER VII: 
ISLAMIC BANKING FOR POWER 
 
 
In popular lore, there are many sayings that relate to the value of money. 
Among these are the idioms that money constitutes ‘power’ and ‘the root of all evil.’ 
Money, however, can also be seen as a major source of state influence, and, from a 
historical perspective, part of the modernisation and restructuring of societies. In 
Malaysia’s example, Islamic Banking, because of its already sizeable and growing 
significance as a portion of the Federation’s financial sector, has helped further 
already existing trends in shifting power away from a traditional elite (in Malaysia’s 
case, the bangsawan, or aristocracy) to an emerging capitalist class. In addition, 
Islamic Banking has assisted the ruling UMNO party to gain ground against the main 
Islamist opposition party, PAS, by portraying itself in terms of religious piety. 
From Tradition to Capitalism 
 
The shift of power to capitalists, to a great degree at the expense of traditional 
elites, is also reflective of changes in Malaysian politics. Islamic Banking itself was 
legally established in 1982, early in the tenure of Mahathir bin Mohamad as 
Malaysia’s Prime Minister. Mahathir’s administration coincidentally heralded an 
increased collusion of interests between political and economic players in Malaysian 
society. Conversely, Mahathir’s relatively open tension with Malay Sultans also led 
to deterioration in relations between the government and its traditional superiors. The 
fact that Islamic Banking coincided with this change cannot be overlooked, especially 
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since the egalitarian nature of Muslim theology may often conflict with the traditional 
Malay power structure, the kerajaan.  
On another level, Islamic Banking has also allowed for some level of political 
consolidation. Because of Malaysia’s status as a majority (though only by the thinnest 
of margins) Muslim state has allowed the main party in the country’s ruling coalition, 
the United Malays National Organisation, or UMNO, to shore up its standing 
amongst the Malay community. The party has, particularly in recent years, struggled 
for votes with the main Islamist opposition party, Parti Islam se Malaysia (PAS). 
Solidifying UMNO’s political position has been achieved with a combination of 
showcasing the party’s Islamic values while giving the government increased 
legitimacy through financial sector growth and development achieved through 
Islamic Banking’s ascendancy.  
Access to capital equals access to power? 
 
Key in understanding Islamic Banking’s potential as a source of power is the 
recognition of its size and scope. In 2007, assets in the Islamic Banking sector of 
Malaysia exceeded RM133 billion (US$38.7 billion), constituting 12.2% of total 
banking assets.124 In particular, and of an importance upon which will be elaborated, 
growth in the Islamic sector was largely because of advances in Islamic financing, 
that is, the Islamic bond market. Islamic products alone accounted for 68% of newly 
issued asset-backed securities (debts which are guaranteed by collateral other than 
real estate, i.e. credit cards).  These statistics, just a snapshot of the overall market 
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picture of Islamic Finance in Malaysia, point to not only the current significance of 
the sector, but its potential to continue to expand.   
Given its size, it is fairly safe to assume that any government would take interest 
in a sector of its economy marked by such size and scope. However, the Malaysian 
government’s commitment to the development of the Islamic sector is furthered by 
the nature of state-business relations within the Federation. Also, initiatives taken by 
the government both to utilise and promote the sector, figure into the equation.   
One of the more direct forms of utilisation of the Islamic sector is the 
government’s offer of Government Investment Issues (GII). Originally introduced in 
July 1983, a year after the promulgation of the Islamic Banking Act (1982), the GII 
was first seen as a way to provide liquid asset instruments to Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad (BIMB), the only operational Islamic bank at the time of issue. The issues 
were designed as a form of an interest-free loan to the Malaysian government for 
development projects. While the government was obliged to return the principal of 
the loan to the GII holder, returns on investment were purely at the discretion of the 
government, significantly decreasing the government’s liability when compared to a 
conventional loan or bond scheme.125 However, despite the fact that GII issues are 
only profitable at the government’s discretion, in 2006 and 2007 such issues generally 
yielded between 3.0% and 3.7%, making them attractive to investors seeking secure 
sources of capital accumulation.126 
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Islamic Banking has, in functioning as a market for public sector investment 
through Government Investment Issues (GII), provided an additional avenue of 
access to capital for the Malaysian government. However, more importantly than this 
is the way that Islamic Banking has been, both inadvertently and intentionally, part of 
a greater trend of power transfer within Malaysia, from traditional elites to an 
emergent coalition of UMNO political principals and capitalists. This trend can be 
seen both in the political events which have shaped contemporary Malaysian society 
as well as the contrasts in personalities holding the Prime Minister’s portfolio. 
Intriguing Parallels with Meiji-era Japan 
 
Transitions of power between pre-industrial elites, generally nobility, and 
emergent cadres of capitalists are neither unique to Malaysia nor a recent 
development. Perhaps one of the most quintessential examples of such a transition, 
facilitated through both armed struggle and societal realignment, was that of the Meiji 
Restoration (roughly 1862-69) in Japan. This period saw the transition of Japan from 
a largely feudal and agrarian society, dominated by the powerful Tokugawa 
Shogunate, to a plutocratic one nominally headed by the Emperor but largely 
controlled by merchant oligarchs.127 
In this instance, the shift of power to a new centre of authority was coupled with 
changes to the control over major segments of the economy, largely at this time being 
in property rights and taxation. Prior to the Meiji restoration, taxation of the peasantry 
came in the form of a levy initiated by the Tokugawa authorities. This was partially 
decentralised, with Daisho (aristocracy in a subordinate position to the Shogun) and 
                                                 
127 Barrrington Moore, op. cit., 275. 
63 
Samurai (warriors at the service of the Daisho and Shogun) dependent upon the 
proceeds of such levies as a source of income.128 Following the initiation of a land tax 
in 1873, the revenues generated from peasants were directly funnelled to the central 
government for use in industrialisation and development. In addition, all lands under 
the control of the Shogunate reverted back to being under the authority of the 
Emperor and his government.129 The end result of these developments was the 
creation of a new state structure, centred on the Emperor and a cadre of Industrial-
Capitalist elites, who, while often aristocratic in background, had their power based in 
control over new modes of industry. This class, which combined pre-existing 
institutions, such as the monarchy, with new ideas of power gleaned from the west, 
would propel Japan towards modernisation and eventual emergence as a Great Power.  
Some similarities may be drawn with the development of political structures in 
Malaysia following the end of the Second World War. Initially, as Hari Singh notes, 
the Sultans were able to exercise important political power in the nascent stages of 
Malaysia’s formation, particularly in opposition to the formation of the British-
conceived Malayan Union (1946-48). This power was co-ordinated with the 
formation of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), which was largely 
founded to oppose the idea of the Malayan Union.130 
UMNO and the Bangsawan: From partners to adversaries? 
 
During the early years of Malaya’s self-government and independence, the party 
was led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia’s first prime minister and a member of 
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the Kedah royal family. However, as Malaysia industrialised, political legitimacy 
began to be driven more by economic growth than by the traditional daulat or power 
of the Sultans as spiritual and political heads of the Malay community.131 With an 
increasing Malay bourgeoisie, the need to utilise the Sultans for political legitimacy, 
particularly in urban areas, became diminished.  
Scholars have placed the turning point in the relationship between UMNO and 
the Malay aristocracy at 1969. Tensions came to a head on 13 May 1969 when 
Malaysia’s opposition parties (mainly Gerakan and the Democratic Action Party, or 
DAP) gained a significant number of seats in parliament. The aftermath of this result 
saw a series of rallies by both opposition parties and UMNO which eventually 
spawned a series of race-driven riots.132 Beneath the actions of the various parties 
involved, however, was a more complex struggle for power between two factions of 
the UMNO leadership: The first, led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, representing the 
bangsawan, and the second, led by Tun Abdul Razak, representing the emergent 
Malay Capitalist class.  
As Kua argues, the emergence of the latter group was largely spelled out in 
successive Malaysia Plans.133 The result of these centrally planned initiatives was a 
vastly expanded bureaucracy, creating various government institutions and boards 
whose management was largely filled by Malays, in line with policies of Malay 
economic empowerment. One organisation which vehemently argued for the 
investment of economic power in the Malay community was the Bumiputra 
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Economic Congresses, which, from 1965, became increasingly more powerful.134 The 
most visible result of this pressure was the institutionalisation of Malay privileges, in 
1967, with the introduction of the National Language Act.135  
However, more important than the communalist aspect of the pro-privilege 
camp was the fact that their desire for power and political legitimacy was based on 
economics instead of the traditional power structure. While the leadership of the 
Tunku was characterised by minimal intrusion into the business realm, with UMNO 
elites having token positions on the boards of Non-Malay companies, the desire of the 
Malay capitalists to broaden economic empowerment to a wide array of 
institutionalised privileges marked a significant departure both in policy and 
ideology.136 This latter group, headed by Tun Abdul Razak and including, at least 
somewhat, future Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad would find itself, following 
the tumultuous events of 1969, with consolidated political control, the usage of which 
would lead to ever deteriorating relations with the traditional elite. 
Malaysia’s NEP: A new trajectory of political power  
 
The most significant initial result of the ascendancy of Tun Abdul Razak’s 
UMNO faction was when the Malaysian government enacted its New Economic 
Policy, or NEP. At the centre of NEP initiatives was a system of incentives and 
positive discrimination policies that were designed to alleviate the economic 
disparities between the Malay population and other communities, particularly the 
Chinese. While these policies were not directly aimed at challenging the position of 
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the Sultans, the ramifications of these policies did make the Sultans less politically 
important to UMNO in shoring up Malay electoral support. 
The reasons for this shift are multi-faceted, and can be seen as factors 
influencing balances of power in many industrialising societies. Firstly, with the onset 
of NEP, many Malays found themselves both better educated and with greater 
individual economic power, in contrast to their previous lot. In addition, economic 
growth and greater levels of education led to internal migration to urban areas from 
the agrarian hinterland of Malaysia itself.  
As much of the Sultans’ legitimacy was driven by patronage towards their 
subjects, the creation of an economically empowered, city-based Malay class 
diminished UMNO’s need to utilise the Sultans’ power for its own ends. No longer 
was the Malay dependent upon the benevolence of his leader for economic wellbeing; 
furthermore, as a more educated person, the likelihood of his submission to a 
patrimonial and absolutist system of loyalty, in which his identity as a Malay was 
inexorably linked to the Sultans themselves, became less likely. UMNO, not the 
Sultans, was the source of his new-found prosperity.137 
Mahathir and the emergence of Malay capitalism 
 
The changes wrought by this shift in power were sizeable, and came to an even 
greater head during the tenure of Mahathir bin Mohamad. Under the auspices of his 
many “mega-project” initiatives, Mahathir effectively consolidated political power 
and made an effective linkage between economic prosperity and politics by making 
UMNO a major economic player in its own right. Examples of this, as noted by Peter 
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Searle, include the North-South Expressway and control of TV3, Malaysia’s main 
English-language television channel.138 
Mahathir, while respectful of the institution of the monarchy, was a firm 
believer in its marginalisation in terms of political power. In his book The Malay 
Dilemma, the future Prime Minister sets out his vision for the Malay race as a modern 
and sophisticated people, detached from the superstitions and customs of the past. 
While he admits that the Malay aristocracy have done no great harm to the Malay 
race, he speaks vehemently of the need for a revolution in which traditional customs, 
or adat, may be discarded.139 
At the same time political consolidation was taking place through an increasing 
amount of political intervention in the economy, the rights of the Malay rulers were 
being eroded, largely under the pretense of misconduct by members of royal families. 
Combined with Mahathir’s seemingly entrenched desire to see the Sultans relegated 
to a role as cultural icons of Malay identity, the Constitutional (Amendment) Act of 
1993 provided for the elimination of legal immunity for the Sultans, though the act 
was eventually toned down, because of significant domestic opposition rooted in 
cultural reasons and a fear of a lack of checks and balances against the government.140 
In balance, though, the assertion of the dominance of the Malay capitalist class, 
personified by Mahathir and his leadership, was all but sealed in the early 1990s 
when the constitutional amendment was tabled. 
                                                 
138 Peter Searle, op. cit., 126. 
139 Mahathir Bin Mohammed, The Malay Dilemma, (Singapore: Donald Moore for Asia Pacific Press, 
1970): p. 105. 
140 Hari Singh, op. cit., 201. 
68 
Islamic Banking, which evolved at the same time that the last nails were being 
placed in the coffin of substantial bangsawan political power, can be seen as another 
outlet of Malay capitalist assertion of power. The fact that the Islamic Banking sector 
came to fruition through a government act, and, until 1999, was completely 
monopolised by a government-linked corporation (Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad) 
represents part and parcel of the Malaysian economic experience.141  
UMNO and Islamic Banking: Piety for political gain? 
 
With Bank Islam, as a Muslim Bank, economic empowerment of Bumiputra 
would take place in an environment in which very few non-Bumiputra players would 
operate, due to Islam being legally the sole religion of Malays. Within this legal 
framework, Bank Islam provided not only employment and profits for Malay 
political/economic elites, but also provided valuable political leverage. Leverage was 
established because pious Malay Muslims needed only to look to the Mahathir 
Administration for the provision of an Islamic Banking environment. This indirectly 
served as a challenge to the traditional role of the Sultans as regulators and preservers 
of the Islamic faith in the Federation, a role they had enjoyed continuously since pre-
colonial times. While the Sultans were still able to make important religious 
decisions, such as the appointment of state muftis, the Mahathir Administration could 
point to Islamic Banking as demonstrating another way the central government 
represented the de facto power in the land and the chief provider for Malays. 
UMNO, the dominant party in Malaysia’s ruling coalition, was able to expand 
its political advantage in the Federation beyond economics. Further consolidation of 
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political support was accomplished by using Islamic Finance to dissipate the appeal 
of the Islamist opposition by portraying UMNO as a promoter of Islam. It should be 
stressed, though, that this aspect of Islamic Banking has only truly gained importance 
since 1999, when PAS, the main Islamist opposition party, significantly diminished 
UMNO’s share of the vote in parliamentary elections. Prior to this, given the notably 
small size of Islamic Banking in Malaysia, the use of Islamic Banking for any broad 
Islamic appeal seems to be limited.142 Thus, this legitimacy can and should be seen as 
a positive by-product rather than a pre-meditated derivative of Islamic Banking’s 
establishment. 
Islamic Banking, as a constituent part of creating an Islamic economic order, 
could be shown to the Malay Muslim population as proof that UMNO was indeed 
concerned with the ability of its compatriots to adhere as closely to the Islamic ideal 
as possible in their everyday lives. In conservative parts of the Federation, 
particularly the rural periphery, this added political capital may prove useful in 
UMNO’s strategies to win Malay voters from PAS. Such a scenario has been repeated 
in other parts of the world, particularly the Middle East, where Islamic Banking has 




In conclusion, with the scale and scope of Islamic Banking in Malaysia 
becoming ever significant, UMNO’s steerage of Islamic Banking has allowed it to 
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generate political capital and legitimacy. This legitimacy, which is linked both to 
economic development and preservation of Malay culture and privilege, is served by 
the creation of an Islamic financial sector in which pious Muslims may operate freely. 
Such ability reinforces the power of UMNO over the traditional elite when relating to 
economic opportunity, and to Islamist opposition when relating to Islamic virtue. 
While perhaps not explicitly planned during the early development of Islamic 
Banking in the 1980s, the results have allowed UMNO to maintain its hold on power, 
and may continue to do so if Islamic Banking continues to prosper.  
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CHAPTER VIII: 
REFLECTIONS UPON A NEW DISCOURSE 
 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have served to illustrate how Islamic 
Banking represents a new financial sector, created and driven by a unique fusion of 
Islamic religious law and principles and the mechanisms and institutions of the 
modern world economic system. Islamic banking and finance has also been shown to 
have several separate and important end results and ramifications in Malaysia, which 
serves as the geographic stage upon which this thesis is focused.  
The first and most basic of consequences from Islamic Banking’s growth has 
been the creation of a new financial sector, landscaped with both Islamic institutions 
and divisions within conventional banks. This new sector has ostensibly allowed 
Muslims to conduct their financial dealings in a halal, or religiously allowed, 
environment, a marked departure from the past, when those of the Islamic persuasion 
found themselves in a potential crisis when conducting financial transactions.144 
Secondly, the rise of Islamic Banking in Malaysia has allowed the Federation 
to orient itself as a major Islamic financial centre, if not the pre-eminent source of 
Islamic financial products and services in the entire world. The ascendancy of the 
Federation in Islamic finance can be seen in the exceptional level of market share it 
has achieved, as well as the sophistication of its Islamic financial institutions and 
training apparati.145 The end result of these factors has been the ability of Malaysia to 
differentiate itself from other regional financial centres in whose shadow it has long 
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resided, notably Singapore and Hong Kong, and acquire some greater level of 
importance in the global marketplace.  
Finally, Malaysia’s ruling elites, most importantly the United Malays National 
Organisation, or UMNO, has been able to acquire additional political capital and 
legitimacy. The benefits UMNO has derived have come from both the economic 
empowerment Islamic banking has provided as well as the notions of Islamic piety 
the sector has supported. The change in both of these areas to UMNO’s advantage has 
significantly helped the party diminish the power of two groups with whom it, at 
times, has a tense relationship, the traditional elites146 (the Sultans and Bangsawan) 
and the Islamists, generally represented by Parti Islam se Malaysia (PAS).147 
When these three broad consequences are evaluated together, one may 
conclude that the combination of events that have corresponded with Islamic 
Banking’s rise have combined to transform the sector. Islamic Banking has then been 
changed from merely being a source of honourable means by which Muslims may do 
business to part of a new and larger system of piety, profit, and power which has and 
continues to shape the political and social discourses of Malaysia. 
Without a doubt, Islamic banking has begun to and will continue to make an 
impact on Malaysia’s financial sector. From humble beginnings in 1983, with a legal 
framework and a single financial institution being established148, the Islamic Finance 
industry has made leaps and bounds to become one of the fastest growing areas of the 
Federation’s economy. Why this growth has occurred, as this thesis has shown, may 
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be attributed to a combination of factors, mainly government guidance and favourable 
intervention into the sector, as well as the gradual development of institutions within 
the industry.  
The influence of piety 
 
In terms of motivations, however, some credence must be given to the 
underlying ideology which shapes Islamic Banking and Finance. It must be 
recognised, beyond the facts and figures associated with the rise of the Islamic system 
that at least some portion of the industry’s existence stems from a desire to reconcile 
the notions of equity and social justice traditionally associated with Islam with the 
realities of a modern and developing society. In Malaysia, this negotiation takes on 
added importance as Malaysia, as the world’s 19th largest trading nation,149 and one of 
the wealthiest developing economies globally, finds itself interconnected with many 
parts of the world, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.  
Whether or not Islamic Banking, particularly in the Malaysian experience, has 
completely adhered to the virtues of Islam has been and continues to be a contentious 
issue. What is important to realise is that Malaysia has and continues to be at the 
forefront of attempting to provide an Islamic alternative to many financial products 
and services deemed essential by many operating in the modern, globalised world.150 
It is this vision and the innovative nature of Malaysia’s negotiation of Islam with 
modernity that may be considered the most important achievement of the 
Federation’s Islamic Banking and Finance industry from a religious perspective.  
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The experience of Malaysia in attempting to create a banking system which 
adheres to Islamic principles should be put in context with the other monotheistic 
religions’ (Christianity and Judaism) attempts to rectify secular financial organs with 
the dictates of scripture. In the case of both religions, the idea of interest is considered 
to be an affront against virtue, as established in the Old Testament (Leviticus 25:35-
37). However, in the case of both Judaism and Christianity, their respective societies 
were never able to eradicate interest, and eventually succumbed to allowing interest 
to be part and parcel of financial dealings.151 It is, therefore, a testament to the scope 
of the ambition of the Islamic World, and more specifically Malaysia, to rectify that 
which has proven nearly impossible to do so in the past.  
A rise to prominence 
 
From a national perspective, the Islamic Banking sector has allowed Malaysia 
accomplish something with which it previously had only limited success; to establish 
itself as a leading global centre and provider of financial products and services. While 
in the Federation’s case this has been limited to just Islamic items, Malaysia has, to 
an extent, been able to emerge from the shadow of more prominent regional financial 
centres, such as Singapore and Hong Kong.152 With its strategic geographic 
advantage between the Middle East and East Asia, as well as its 20+ years of 
experience in providing Islamic products and services,153 Malaysia has shown itself to 
be capable of becoming a first-tier financial centre, if only for halal offerings.  
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While Malaysia lacks much of the financial interconnectivity and 
infrastructure that is commonplace in Singapore and Hong Kong, and has a 
significantly smaller number of multinational bank offices in Kuala Lumpur, the 
Federation has been increasingly successful at attracting regional players from the 
Middle East to invest in Islamic financial institutions as well as establish their own. In 
essence, Malaysia has reverted to a niche-driven approach to promoting itself as a 
major financial centre, rather than attempting to compete head-on with other regional 
centres. In fact, many in Malaysia envision the development of Islamic Banking to 
take place in coordination with East Asian financial heavyweights, in order to 
facilitate the entry of Kuala Lumpur-based Islamic institutions and products into a 
broader and more sophisticated marketplace.  
Political benefits 
 
With the combination of religious motivation, as well as fiscal success which 
has been indicative of Malaysia’s foray into Islamic Banking, the political dividends 
for the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) political elite have been 
significant. As has been shown, the accomplishments of Malaysia’s Islamic sector 
have allowed UMNO to consolidate power and cement its legitimacy in relation to 
economic development and empowerment of the majority Malay ethnic group.154 In 
addition, UMNO’s political position in relation to Malaysia’s Islamist political 
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movement, Parti Islam se Malaysia (PAS) has been strengthened, through portraying 
UMNO and its leadership as promoters and protectors of Islamic virtue.155 
Islamic Banking can be essentially seen as a practical application of the idea 
of Islam Hadhari, a development-oriented strain of Islamic theology promoted by the 
UMNO leadership to the Federation’s Muslim communities. By promoting economic 
development and empowerment through Islamic principles, UMNO has been able to 
effectively contrast itself against PAS, which, following the Asian financial crisis, 
strengthened dramatically and greatly diminished UMNO’s electoral support from its 
political base.156 While some critics have alleged that UMNO has become 
increasingly Islamist in its rhetoric, in the raw calculus of politics, the use of Islam 
Hadhari and Islamic Banking for political gain would seem to have been effective, 
particularly when examining the subsequent election results of 2004, in which PAS 
electoral gains from 1999 were largely reversed.157 
The merger of banking and power 
 
With the combination of religious, financial, and political advantages which 
have been created with Islamic Banking’s rise to the vanguard of Malaysia’s financial 
services industry, the discussion of Islamic Banking may be seen to be reflective of 
and an influence upon a greater social discourse taking place within the Federation. 
The existence of a significant Islamic financial sector in Malaysia, a country which is 
exceptionally heterogeneous compared with other states actively involved in Islamic 
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Banking, is exceptional, and can be seen the light of current debate within Malaysia 
as to its identity as a Muslim or secular state.  
Malaysia’s economic and political landscapes, which are linked with a 
relatively high level of sophistication and depth, have become even further 
intermingled with the emergence of Islamic Banking. This is particularly true due to 
the nature of Malaysian politics, where ethnic identity is largely linked to political 
affiliation. Malaysia’s political discourse is furthered by the depth and sophistication 
of linkages between state and industry, either in the form of government-linked 
corporations or through the placement of key government officials or individuals 
joined with them into the management or directorship of major companies. Islamic 
Banking is no different, as every aspect of the sector, from its initial development to 
its growth through liberalisation has been inextricably linked to government 
initiatives.158 
Islamic Banking, given its ascendance, should continue for the near future as 
an integral part of Malaysia’s increasing attempts to rectify its society with the 
demands of the modern world as well as the religious sensitivities of its populace. 
While Islamic Banking, as has been noted, does possess a largely religious aspect, the 
political and economic gains resultant from the sector’s success have transformed 
Islamic Banking from being a means of reconciling Muslim values with modern 
economics to a tool for political and profitable ends.  
Unique to Islamic Banking, however, as opposed to previous initiatives 
promulgated by the UMNO-led Malaysian government, is the fusion of religion 
within its promotion. While Malaysia’s government has always had a development-
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driven approach to shoring up its legitimacy (i.e. linking government legitimacy to 
economic development), much of its approach reflects a secular perspective. The 
fusion of religion with the development of a sector of the economy, albeit in this case 
one which was being concurrently developed in other parts of the world, has 
demonstrated perhaps the most explicit practical application of the Malaysian 
government’s development programmes with an Islamic appeal. 
While the government has proven successful in its aims to develop Islamic 
Banking, challenges do potentially remain. One key issue which, while independent 
of Islamic Banking’s prominence in itself, does continue to resonate in the 
Federation’s political and economic discourse, is the question of whether government 
initiatives, such as Islamic Banking, will ever effectively create an independent 
Malay middle class. Whereas a Malay middle class does exist, the deep-seated 
relationship between that segment of society and the government, which serves as a 
large source of its prosperity, has led many to speculate that creating a bourgeoisie 
with a truly entrepreneurial mentality may prove challenging.159 
While the level of government saturation in the Malaysian economy at the 
time of this thesis continues to be high, the ability of the Federation to create a new 
economic order, which combines attentiveness to Muslims while embracing the 
challenges and opportunities of modernity, remains to be seen. However, the success 
of Islamic Banking, and Malaysia’s ability to effectively mobilise and promote its 
resources has reaped rewards, both in the Federation’s prosperity and its position at 
the forefront of modern Islam. While Malaysia’s social discourse remains one marred 
by tension and, at times, opaqueness of direction, its ability to embrace both 
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